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Note
Incognito Mode Is in the Constitution
Travis Panneck
“Visibility is a trap.”1

INTRODUCTION
The Dread Pirate Roberts was apprehended not on the high
seas but in the stacks of the San Francisco Public Library.2
“Dread Pirate Roberts”3 (DPR) was the name adopted by an internet user who had created and maintained the Silk Road, an
online black market where users could buy and sell illicit drugs,
medical supplies, and even Thai energy drinks.4 After a lengthy
investigation5 involving fake identities, a staged torture, and a
trip to Iceland,6 the FBI believed that they had identified the
man behind the moniker: Ross William Ulbricht.
 J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to
Professor Kevin Reitz and the editors and staffers of the Minnesota Law Review
for comments, suggestions, and diligent editorial work. All remaining mistakes
are my own. Copyright © 2019 by Travis Panneck.
1. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
200 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
2. Natasha Bertrand, The FBI Staged a Lovers’ Fight To Catch the Kingpin of the Web’s Biggest Illegal Drug Marketplace, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 22, 2015),
https://www.businessinsider.com/the-arrest-of-silk-road-mastermind-ross
-ulbricht-2015-1 [https://perma.cc/G6A6-CWC4].
3. The name derives from the fictional character from The Princess Bride
who turns out to be not one man, but several who pass the identity to successors
to maintain a fearsome reputation. See THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox
1987) (“I am not the Dread Pirate Roberts . . . . My name is Ryan; I inherited
the ship from the previous Dread Pirate Roberts, just as you will inherit it from
me. The man I inherited it from is not the real Dread Pirate Roberts either.”).
4. See 15 Things You Could Have Purchased on Silk Road, COMPLEX (Oct.
3, 2013), https://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2013/10/silk-road/
[https://perma.cc/9DG9-DHTJ].
5. For a narrative account of this investigation and the capture of Ulbricht, see generally NICK BILTON, AMERICAN KINGPIN: THE EPIC HUNT FOR
THE CRIMINAL MASTERMIND BEHIND THE SILK ROAD (2017).
6. Joshuah Bearman, The Rise & Fall of Silk Road, Part 2: The Fall,
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Leading up to Ulbricht’s arrest, the government tried to associate Ulbricht with the DPR moniker and the Silk Road by
warrantlessly collecting information about his internet use.7 Using “pen registers” and “trap and trace” devices to monitor Ulbricht’s home router, the government obtained detailed information about Ulbricht’s internet activity, including dates and
times of use, duration of use, and other connection data.8 Without ever having to show probable cause, the government peered
into Ulbricht’s daily internet use and built its case against him.9
On the basis of this comprehensive and intrusive internet surveillance, the government obtained a warrant for Ulbricht’s arrest.10 Law enforcement seized Ulbricht and his laptop at the
public library while he allegedly was working on the Silk Road.11
Ulbricht was tried, convicted, and sentenced to two life sentences.12 His conviction was affirmed on appeal.13
It is not merely masterminds of online marketplaces for
drugs that should be worried about surveillance of internet
use.14 Online companies currently hold massive amounts of information about their users that is comprehensive and accurate;15 rarely do people attempt to deceive their own computer
WIRED (June 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/silk-road-2/ [https://perma
.cc/945R-PEHX].
7. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ulbricht v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2708 (2018) (No. 17-950), 2017 WL 6812114, at *5.
8. Id. at 5–6, 2017 WL 6812114, at *5–6.
9. Id. at 5–6, 2017 WL 6812114, at *5–6.
10. Id. at 6–7, 2017 WL 6812114, at *6–7.
11. See Bertrand, supra note 2.
12. See Katherine Mangu-Ward, Ross Ulbricht Is Serving a Double Life
Sentence, REASON (July 2018), https://reason.com/2018/05/31/ross-ulbricht-is
-serving-a-dou [https://perma.cc/84F2-K8QZ]. The minimum sentence was ten
years. Id.
13. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 90 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 2708 (2018).
14. Consider, for example, six anonymous commenters that dared to express displeasure with Judge Katherine Forrest’s decision in Ulbricht’s case.
The blog on which those comments appeared was served with a grand jury subpoena for “any and all identifying information” about those commenters. See
Nick Gillespie & Matt Welch, How Government Stifled Reason’s Free Speech,
REASON (June 19, 2015, 5:08 PM), https://reason.com/2015/06/19/government
-stifles-speech/ [https://perma.cc/4ZUF-NLCF].
15. See, e.g., Dylan Curran, Are You Ready? Here Is All the Data Facebook
and Google Have on You, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian
.com/commentisfree/2018/mar/28/all-the-data-facebook-google-has-on-you
-privacy [https://perma.cc/7Q28-A823].
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about what they are looking for or communicating about online.
As Bruce Schneier put it: “No one ever lies to a search engine.”16
Though many are aware of the massive records held by companies like Facebook and Google, Professor Paul Ohm has argued that the information held by internet service providers
alone could be used to “compile a detailed record of thoughts and
behavior,” getting lists of what you “read, watch, buy, and borrow.”17 The potential for harm arising from access to this information, Ohm says, is “limited only by the wickedness of one’s
imagination.”18 While current United States law requires a warrant when the government seeks the “contents” of internet communications,19 this may not in practice limit the government
from discovering the content via other forms of internet history
that are less protected under the law.20 The Supreme Court’s
revolutionary decision in Carpenter v. United States21 presents a
new way forward that safeguards legitimate privacy interests in
internet activity while still allowing law enforcement to police
the internet’s worst members.
This Note will argue that Carpenter heralds a new approach
to Fourth Amendment searches that courts can and should apply
to law enforcement’s collection of non-content internet history
and basic subscriber information. Part I will explain the traditional approach to applying the Fourth Amendment to law enforcement acquisition of internet history. Then, Part I will lay
out the decision in Carpenter and how the Court’s approach to
the Fourth Amendment appears to have shifted. Part II will
show that lower courts do not presently appear to be responding
16. Liz Mineo, On Internet Privacy, Be Very Afraid, HARV. GAZETTE (Aug.
24, 2017), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2017/08/when-it-comes-to
-internet-privacy-be-very-afraid-analyst-suggests/
[https://perma.cc/5HZX-C9A9].
17. Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1417, 1445 (2009).
18. Id. at 1444.
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(b) (2012). For a discussion of how law enforcement
collects various forms of internet history, see infra Part I.C.
20. See Saul Hansell, One Subpoena Is All It Takes To Reveal Your Online
Life, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 7, 2008), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/07/07/
the-privacy-risk-from-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/KBH9-Q5RZ] (“[W]ith a subpoena, the Internet provider can be forced to identify which of their customers
was assigned a particular I.P. address at a particular time. That is how the
recording industry has been identifying and suing people who use file sharing
programs.”).
21. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
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to this shift, restricting the reasoning in Carpenter to the narrow
set of facts before the Court in that case. Part II will also demonstrate that the current limitations on the collection of internet
history are insufficient and illustrate how a failure to accord
greater protections threatens privacy. Finally, Part III will posit
that courts can and should extend Carpenter’s reasoning to cover
non-content internet history and subscriber information. Part
III will further suggest that courts should ultimately require
that law enforcement seeking to collect these data obtain a warrant founded on probable cause.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW
SURROUNDING COLLECTION OF INTERNET HISTORY
The use of the internet produces massive amounts of information,22 much of which may be of interest to law enforcement
seeking to root out crime. Law enforcement must, however, abide
by the Fourth Amendment, which protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”23 “Searches” is a term of limitation,
meaning that the Fourth Amendment does not reach conduct
that is not a “search.”24 Where a Fourth Amendment “search”
does not occur, there is no constitutional requirement that police
conduct be reasonable. While Congress is free to set up additional protections for citizens against actions of law enforcement,25 the Constitution does not hamstring law enforcement
conduct that is not a search.
This Part will describe how the government can currently
collect information about a criminal suspect’s internet history
and a recent development in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
that may require changes in these established methods. First,
Section A will describe the different types of history a user generates when they use the internet. Next, Section B will provide
the constitutional backdrop for government collection of internet
history, including a description of the law of searches and an important exception, the third-party doctrine. Section C will then
describe how this law is applied in practice, showing the application of the third-party doctrine to internet history and subscriber information. Finally, Section D will describe Carpenter v.
22. See Josh James, Data Never Sleeps 6.0, DOMO (June 5, 2018), https://
www.domo.com/blog/data-never-sleeps-6/ [https://perma.cc/C9M2-DMTR].
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 356 (1974).
25. Limited of course by their constitutional ambit.
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United States, a recent Supreme Court decision that may upend
how the government collects a criminal suspect’s internet history.
A. THE CREATION AND STORAGE OF INTERNET HISTORY
When someone uses the internet, a great deal of history
about their session is created and stored. The internet is a set of
protocols that allows computers to communicate with each
other.26 For example, if DPR wants to access a webpage on the
internet, DPR’s computer needs to know where the webpage is
and what the webpage contains.
To identify where a webpage lives on the internet, computers must be able to find each other. To accomplish this, each computer connected to the internet is given an Internet Protocol (IP)
address. IP addresses “are the unique numbers assigned to every
computer or device that is connected to the Internet.”27 Users
typically obtain IP addresses through internet service providers
(ISPs).28 Buying an internet connection generally entails communicating basic subscriber information to an ISP, which may
include the user’s real name, address, email addresses, and
credit card or bank numbers. ISPs obtain allocations of IP addresses from registries, which they then assign to users that buy
connections to the internet from them.29 Usually, these IP addresses are dynamic—the home user’s IP address can change

26. See generally Aaron Titus, How the Internet Works in 5 Minutes,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 18, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7_LPdttKXPc (explaining the basic structure of the internet).
27. ICANN, BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO INTERNET PROTOCOL (IP) ADDRESSES 2
(2011), https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/ip-addresses-beginners
-guide-04mar11-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C9UQ-LDRM]. The use of “unique”
here may not be entirely accurate. As noted later in this paragraph, IP addresses can change upon connection to the internet. Because there are a limited
number of IP addresses, this can lead to situations where an internet service
provider (ISP) may allocate an IP address to a user that has already been assigned before or is currently in use by another user. This Note is concerned with
the situation where an IP address has provided reliable information about a
user. But it is important to realize that the use of IP addresses as an investigative tool at all is itself fraught. See AARON MACKEY ET AL., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., UNRELIABLE INFORMANTS: IP ADDRESSES, DIGITAL TIPS AND POLICE RAIDS (2016), https://www.eff.org/files/2016/09/22/2016.09.20_final_
formatted_ip_address_white_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/57TM-ABWH].
28. See Number Resources, INTERNET ASSIGNED NUMBERS AUTHORITY,
https://www.iana.org/numbers [https://perma.cc/NV99-VUWC].
29. See id.
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each time they connect to the internet.30 Registries keep track of
which IPs they issue to which ISPs, such that if a person knows
an IP address, they can determine which ISP issued that address.31 Information about which ISP issued which IP address is
publicly available.32
IP addresses are 32-bit numbers expressed as a “dotted decimal number,” like so: 162.241.16.20.33 Perhaps because people
have trouble remembering long strings of numbers,34 computers
(most often servers providing websites) can be given “domain
names.”35 Domain name servers (DNS) may then be used to associate a domain name with an IP address.36 For example, querying a DNS would tell a user that minnesotalawreview.org is,
as of this writing,37 located at 162.241.16.20.
But an IP address and domain name can only tell a user on
which website a webpage lives, not what is on the webpage. A
more specific address, called a uniform resource locator (URL),
is used to direct a computer to a specific piece of content on the
internet, such as a particular webpage.38 URLs are displayed in
30. See Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS
(Apr. 3, 2001), https://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet/basics/internet
-infrastructure9.htm [https://perma.cc/KR7P-S8BX]. Some users that seek to
run servers will obtain a “static” IP address that does not change. Id.
31. See AM. REGISTRY FOR INTERNET NUMBERS, https://www.arin.net
[https://perma.cc/EX89-Z7SH].
32. See id.
33. ICANN, supra note 27, at 5. Note that not all IP addresses take this
form. See id. IPv4 addresses look like this, but ISPs and other network operators
are switching to IPv6 because IPv4 can only support just over four billion devices. Id. IPv6 addresses are 128-bit numbers that take the form
2001:0db8:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:0053. Id. IPv6 supports more devices,
having a capacity of 340 undecillion addresses. Id.
34. See, e.g., Lauren Schenkman, In the Brain, Seven Is a Magic Number,
ABCNEWS (Dec. 6, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/brain-memory
-magic-number/story?id=9189664 [https://perma.cc/H8J8-PHRL] (“[O]n average, the longest sequence a normal person can recall on the fly contains about
seven items.”).
35. See Web Terms 101: The Difference Between a URL, Domain, Website,
and More., GOOGLE DOMAINS, https://domains.google/learning-center/web
-terms-101/ [https://perma.cc/EP5T-8WR4].
36. See DNS and WHOIS – How It Works, ICANN WHOIS, https://whois
.icann.org/en/dns-and-whois-how-it-works [https://perma.cc/3QV8-ZNXT] (last
updated July 2017).
37. Website accessed on October 14, 2019.
38. See Tim Berners-Lee, Universal Resource Identifiers in WWW, WORLD
WIDE WEB CONSORTIUM, https://www.w3.org/Addressing/URL/uri-spec.html
[https://perma.cc/9XSD-V9YP].
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the “address bar” of most web browsers and may look like this:
https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/11/21/carpenter-iphone-fourth-amendment/. URLs will usually include the domain
name (minnesotalawreview.org) and additional text directing
the computer to serve a specific piece of content (/2017/11/21/carpenter-iphone-fourth-amendment/). Once a computer requests
content from a URL, that content is divided into packets, which
are then reassembled to deliver the content on the destination
computer.39
This internet traffic is directed through ports.40 A port “is a
type of electronic, software- or programming-related docking
point through which information flows from a program on your
computer or to your computer from the Internet or another computer in a network.”41 Some types of internet traffic, like email
and hypertext (what most webpages use), receive specific port
numbers to identify and direct the internet traffic, such that the
information is only available through that port.42 These reserved
ports might be thought of as filters that only allow one type of
content through. To continue the example from above, web
browsers accessing the Minnesota Law Review webpage will
“ask” to receive information through port 80, the port number
reserved
for
hypertext
transfer
(represented
as
162.241.16.20:80). If a request is made on port 80 to see the Law
Review’s webpage, it will succeed. Trying to access the page
through a port reserved for some other type of content, like port
17 (represented as 162.241.16.20:17), which is reserved for servers providing quotes of the day, would fail: the computer hosting
the webpage would reject the request.
ISPs can see (and therefore collect) most of this information.43 Despite efforts to encrypt connections to reduce visibility of this information, ISPs can see domain names and may also

39. See What Is a Packet?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Dec. 1, 2000), https://
computer.howstuffworks.com/question525.htm [https://perma.cc/398L-VQNM].
40. See What Is a Port?, WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM,
https://whatismyipaddress.com/port [https://perma.cc/G7KD-WCJF].
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See Aaron Rieke et al., What ISPs Can See, UPTURN (Mar. 2016),
https://www.upturn.org/reports/2016/what-isps-can-see/ [https://perma.cc/
3BYE-WHUY]. Servers of individual websites can also track information like
which IP addresses visit which aspects of their website at what times of day.
See, e.g., Log Files, APACHE HTTP SERVER PROJECT, https://httpd.apache.org/
docs/1.3/logs.html [https://perma.cc/XU25-TJ9Y]. However, owners of servers
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be able to see URLs and content that users visit.44 URLs and
content can reveal sensitive information about a user, including
health problems, debts, and consumer product preferences.45 Domain names and IP addresses may be less revealing, but collectively may give substantial insight into a person’s personal predilections.
While a history of the IP addresses that a user visits can be
revealing, the user’s own IP address may also provide information about them. An IP address may provide a rough sense of
location, and ISPs certainly know which user they have given
which IP address.46 Though the accuracy will vary user to user,
IP addresses could be used as a location-tracking tool.47
All this information is potentially reachable and useful to
law enforcement. If law enforcement comes across an IP address
accessing contraband, they might ask an ISP to provide information about who they issued that IP address to.48 Law enforcement suspecting someone of accessing certain websites containing contraband might install a device to track which websites a
person accesses.49 In some cases, law enforcement may want to
request all of a person’s communications over Facebook or Twitter to find evidence of a crime.50 To determine whether any or all
of this conduct triggers Fourth Amendment protections, one
are less likely to have access to the real name, address, and other identifying
information associated with a user’s IP address. See id.
44. See Rieke et al., supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. See How Your IP Address Could Lead Anyone to Your Front Door,
WHATISMYIPADDRESS.COM, https://whatismyipaddress.com/find-me
[https://perma.cc/XRW8-3EE3].
47. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 118–20, United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-1815), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2708
(2018), 2016 WL 158389, at *118–20.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 2008)
(“Pennsylvania authorities obtained another disclosure order requiring Cox to
provide the subscriber information for that IP address.”).
49. See, e.g., Ulbricht, 858 F.3d at 95 (“[T]he government used five pen registers and trap and trace devices to monitor IP addresses associated with Internet traffic to and from Ulbricht’s wireless home router and devices that regularly connected to that router.”).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, No. 4:18-CR-215-CDP-NAB, 2018 WL
7114606, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 12, 2018) (“Detective Burton learned that the
arrangements for the sale of the heroin or fentanyl had been made through Facebook Messenger. The detective then applied for a search warrant . . . .”), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 4:18CR00215 SNLJ, 2019 WL 319402 (E.D.
Mo. Jan. 24, 2019).
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must gaze into the Fourth Amendment law surrounding
searches and seizures, an area of law that “has not—to put it
mildly—run smooth.”51
B. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE
The modern test for when government conduct amounts to
a Fourth Amendment search was first formulated in Katz v.
United States.52 In Katz, the Court held that law enforcement
had conducted a Fourth Amendment search when they bugged a
public payphone.53 Recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
protected “people, not places,”54 the Court rejected an earlier approach to the Fourth Amendment under cases like Olmstead v.
United States, which required an invasion of a property interest
for a Fourth Amendment search to occur.55 Justice Harlan’s concurrence, later adopted by the Court in full,56 set out a two-prong
test for when government collection of information constituted a
search: (1) the person must exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy in the information; and (2) the expectation of privacy
must be one that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”57
The Supreme Court has recognized a notable exception to
the Katz test in the third-party doctrine.58 The doctrine provides

51. Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
52. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
53. Id. at 353.
54. Id. at 351.
55. Id. at 352; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
The Court has recently revived this approach to the Fourth Amendment, with
the late Justice Scalia being the most fervent advocate of the claim that Katz
did not overrule this line of cases, but merely added additional protections. See,
e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (“[T]hough Katz may add to the
baseline, it does not subtract anything . . . .”); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 408 (2012) (“Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope.”). Justice
Gorsuch has also expressed sympathy for this approach. See Carpenter v.
United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2267–68 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
traditional approach asked if a house, paper or effect was yours under
law. . . . Though now often lost in Katz’s shadow, this traditional understanding
persists.”).
56. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (using Justice
Harlan’s two-step formulation to frame the Fourth Amendment analysis).
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. For a more complete overview of the third-party doctrine background
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that “if information is possessed or known by third parties, then,
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, an individual lacks a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.”59
The first cases to recognize this limitation to Fourth Amendment protections were cases that concerned the use of undercover informants, wires, and eavesdropping. Prior to Katz, the
Court held in On Lee v. United States that there was not a Fourth
Amendment problem with being informed upon by a friend wearing a wire.60 In On Lee, Lee was selling opium from his laundry
in Hoboken.61 Lee had a conversation about the opium with his
friend, who turned out to be wearing a wire and acting as an
undercover informant for the Bureau of Narcotics.62 The Court
found that because the “friend” had entered with the consent of
Lee, there was no Fourth Amendment violation.63 Three cases
following On Lee confirmed that there was no Fourth Amendment search when a suspect voluntarily disclosed information to
an undercover informant.64
Following Katz, the Court reassessed the question of
whether undercover informants violated the Fourth Amendment. After all, wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping did
not violate the Fourth Amendment under the Olmstead regime
because there had been no “official search” nor a “physical invasion.”65 Yet, in United States v. White, the Court found that, despite the change to the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test,

prior to Carpenter, see Monu Bedi, The Fourth Amendment Disclosure Doctrines, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 461 (2017); Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV 561, 567–70 (2009).
59. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528
(2006).
60. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
61. Id. at 748–49.
62. Id. at 749.
63. Id. at 753–54.
64. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (“Neither this
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 209 (1966) (“[I]n the detection of many types of crime, the Government
is entitled to use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.”); Lopez v.
United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963) (“We think the risk that petitioner took
in offering a bribe to Davis fairly included the risk that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical recording.”).
65. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 748 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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there was still no Fourth Amendment violation when law enforcement listened in on conversations conducted by someone
voluntarily wearing a wire.66 In White, James A. White was tried
and convicted on narcotics charges.67 Law enforcement had surreptitiously listened in on White’s conversations with one of their
informants using a wire and radio equipment.68 The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that Katz had overruled
On Lee.69
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.70 The
Court carried forward the precedent that a person carrying on
conversation with another about illegal activities cannot reasonably expect privacy; they assume the risk of being informed
upon.71 The Court noted that the Fourth Amendment could not
protect against friends later reporting their conversations to the
police.72 Given this precedent, the Court reasoned that lines
could not be so finely drawn between the informant that merely
reported what was said to the police and the informant that wore
a wire.73 The logic thus survived Katz.
Following White, cases in the 1970s found that information
communicated in business records to businesses was the same
as information communicated to undercover informants. In
United States v. Miller, the government issued subpoenas to
Mitch Miller’s bank to obtain “all records of [his] accounts.”74
Without advising Miller, the bank turned over his incriminating
records to the government.75 Holding that Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records, the Court explained that Miller had “voluntarily conveyed” the records to the
bank and that the information was “exposed to their employees
in the ordinary course of business.”76 The Court thus extended
the third-party doctrine beyond conversations to encompass
66. Id. at 750.
67. Id. at 746–47.
68. Id. at 747.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. . . . But if he
has no doubts, or allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his.”).
72. Id. at 751.
73. Id. at 751–52.
74. 425 U.S. 435, 437 (1976).
75. Id. at 438.
76. Id. at 442.
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business records.
The third-party doctrine was expanded again in Smith v.
Maryland.77 In Smith, Michael Lee Smith allegedly robbed Patricia McDonough and afterwards placed several obscene and
threatening phone calls to her residence.78 Based on a description of Smith’s car, police identified Smith and requested the local phone company to track the numbers dialed from Smith’s
phone using a device called a “pen register.”79 Police made this
request without a warrant.80 Upon review of the calls placed
from Smith’s phone, police found that Smith had dialed
McDonough’s number and, on that basis, obtained a search warrant for his home.81 This search revealed incriminating evidence.82 The trial court denied Smith’s motion to suppress the
pen register evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds and the
appeals court affirmed.83
The Supreme Court affirmed the appeals court ruling.84 Recognizing the reasonable expectation of privacy test discussed
above,85 the Court rejected that Smith had either a subjective
expectation of privacy, or an expectation of privacy that society
was prepared to recognize as reasonable.86 In determining that
Smith had no subjective expectation of privacy, the Court narrowed in on the specific activity that Smith would have sought
to preserve as private.87 Here, the Court distinguished between
the “contents” of Smith’s communications and the numbers dialed. The Court reasoned that while Smith may have desired to
conceal the content of his communication with McDonough by
using the phone inside his private residence, he could not make
the same claim about concealing the numbers he dialed.88 The
Court concluded that even if Smith had a subjective expectation
77. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
78. Id. at 737.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 737–38.
84. Id. at 746.
85. Id. at 740.
86. Id. at 743–44.
87. Id. at 743 (“Although petitioner’s conduct may have been calculated to
keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not
have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed.”).
88. Id.
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of privacy, it was not one society was prepared to recognize as
reasonable.89 The Court favorably quoted Miller and White, noting that Smith had assumed the risk that the number he dialed
would be turned over to the police by sending it to the phone
company.90
The Court then rejected two of Smith’s arguments notable
for the electronic context. First, the Court concluded that automation made no difference.91 Despite the fact that Smith did not
directly communicate the phone numbers to a human, he had
still exposed his information by revealing it to the phone company’s equipment.92 Second, it did not matter whether the phone
company regularly recorded phone numbers. Declining to make
a “crazy quilt” out of the Fourth Amendment, the Court found
the only significant fact was that Smith had exposed his phone
number to a company with the capacity to record the information.93 That alone meant the information could not be protected.
C. COLLECTION OF INTERNET HISTORY BY THE GOVERNMENT
Based on the Court’s holdings in Smith and Miller, one
might expect that the third-party doctrine would render all information that ISPs collect on internet users available to law enforcement. Though this is broadly true, Congress has passed legislation that adds some additional protections to internet history
and subscriber information not covered by the Fourth Amendment. This Section will explain how courts have applied the
third-party doctrine to the internet and the two statutory mechanisms under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA)94 that define when law enforcement may compel
an ISP to turn over an internet user’s records.
1. Applying the Third-Party Doctrine to the Internet
The Court decided Miller and Smith in the very early stages
of the internet,95 likely without a concept of what the internet
89. Id.
90. Id. at 744.
91. Id. at 744–45.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 744.
94. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712
(2012)).
95. See generally BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., INTERNET SOC’Y, BRIEF HISTORY
OF THE INTERNET (1997), https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/
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was to become (if the Justices were even aware of the internet).
Though the Supreme Court has yet to rule conclusively on the
application of the Fourth Amendment to the internet,96 lower
court decisions have suggested that the third-party doctrine applies to much of the non-content internet history discussed
above.97 Courts confronting the issue have uniformly concluded
that basic subscriber information, IP addresses, and email addresses in the to/from lines are “addressing information” equivalent to the phone numbers dialed in Smith.98
In United States v. Forrester, the Ninth Circuit held that
these pieces of information were “constitutionally indistinguishable” from the information in Smith.99 The Forrester court first
reasoned that, like the phone numbers in Smith, users know or
should know that this information is necessary to route the content information.100 Thus, any information turned over was
turned over “voluntarily.”101 Second, the court held that this information was not itself content information because it could
only reveal as much content as a phone number could.102 Be-

2017/09/ISOC-History-of-the-Internet_1997.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LVU-HLGZ]
(providing a brief overview of the history of the internet); LO AND BEHOLD, REVERIES OF THE CONNECTED WORLD (Magnolia Pictures 2016) (reflecting on the
history of and future possibilities for the internet).
96. Cf. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties. . . . This approach is ill suited to the digital age . . . .”).
97. See supra Part I.A.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010)
(“[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address . . . .”); United
States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal court to
address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet
provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expectation.”);
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that
computer surveillance to obtain “to/from addresses of e-mail messages, the IP
addresses of websites visited and the total amount of data transmitted to or
from an account” did not require warrant protections).
99. Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
100. Id. (“Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they visit because
they should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.”).
101. Id.
102. See id. (“[W]hen an individual dials a pre-recorded information or subject-specific line, such as sports scores, lottery results or phone sex lines, the
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cause the Smith Court had already concluded that phone numbers were not content, this kind of internet history could not be
content either.103 The court analogized this information to the
information on the outside of an envelope—people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information inside in the envelope (the content), but not the non-content addressing information on the outside of the envelope.104
The Forrester court and other courts have, however, afforded
protections to content information on the internet. The Forrester
court exempted URLs from its analysis, noting that a “URL, unlike an IP address, identifies the particular document within a
website that a person views and thus reveals much more information about the person’s internet activity.”105 The content of an
email is also protected by the Fourth Amendment and requires
a warrant based on probable cause.106
Despite non-content and subscriber information not being
protected under the Fourth Amendment, Congress has stepped
in to afford some limited protections to disclosure of this information by the companies that hold it.
2. Statutory Mechanisms: The Stored Communications Act
and the Pen/Trap Statute
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986107 provides procedures by which the government can obtain information about a user’s internet activity. One of the ways that the
government can obtain internet traffic information is by requesting it through “electronic communications services,” typically

phone number may even show that the caller had access to specific content information.”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 511 (“E-mail, like physical mail, has an outside address ‘visible’
to the third-party carriers that transmit it to its intended location, and also a
package of content that the sender presumes will be read only by the intended
recipient. The privacy interests in these two forms of communication are identical. The contents may deserve Fourth Amendment protection, but the address
and size of the package do not.”).
105. Id. at 510 n.6.
106. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The government may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause.”);
see also United States v. Ackerman, 831 F.3d 1292, 1306–07 (10th Cir. 2016).
107. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712
(2012)).
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ISPs.108 The Stored Communications Act (SCA),109 Title II of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, governs how
the government may compel providers to disclose stored electronic communications.110
The government may obtain internet traffic information
from an ISP through a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (a
D order).111 A D order allows law enforcement to obtain most records of user information held by ISPs, including subscriber information and records of IP addresses visited by a particular
user.112 Under § 2703, “[a] court order . . . shall issue only if the
governmental entity offers specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the . . . records . . . are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”113 Legislative history and subsequent court interpretations of this Section have suggested that this is a standard
lower than probable cause, similar to the reasonable suspicion
standard articulated in Terry v. Ohio.114
If the government only wants to find out the identity of a
person associated with a known IP address, the standard is even
lower. Basic subscriber information, including a person’s name,
address, records of lengths of connection, and sources of payment, is available upon subpoena.115 The standard for issuing a
subpoena is even more lenient than the specific and articulable
facts standard required for a D order.116
108. For a discussion of what constitutes an “electronic service provider” under the Stored Communications Act, see H. MARSHALL JARRETT ET AL., OFFICE
OF LEGAL EDUC., SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 117–19 (2009), https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009
.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QEU-PA64].
109. Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712
(2012)). The phrase “Stored Communications Act” appears nowhere in the statute, but that is how it is popularly referred to. See JARRETT ET AL., supra note
108, at 115 n.1.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
111. JARRETT et al., supra note 108, at 130.
112. See id. at 130–32.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 131; see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–27 (1968) (describing the
standard).
115. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2).
116. JARRETT ET AL., supra note 108, at 128 (“The legal threshold for issuing
a subpoena is low. . . . Investigators may obtain disclosure pursuant to
§ 2703(c)(2) using any federal or state grand jury or trial subpoena or an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute.”).
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If the government, however, wishes to obtain information
about internet activity in real-time, they may seek to compel installation of a pen register and/or a trap and trace device.117
Whereas monitoring an internet user’s content in real-time
would be governed by the federal Wiretap Act,118 the government
can monitor “addressing information” under a lower standard
using the Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (Pen/Trap
Statute or PTS) chapter of Title 18.119
In the telephony context, pen registers and trap and trace
devices are distinct. Pen registers monitor outgoing numbers
and trap and trace devices monitor incoming numbers.120 In the
internet context, both incoming and outgoing information is contained in the same entity, called a header.121 So, the devices used
to capture internet headers in real-time are called “pen/trap” devices.122 Used in the internet context, these devices may capture
“almost all non-content information in a communication.”123 In
other words, these devices can capture the IP addresses of computers receiving and sending messages, port numbers, and email
to/from addresses. The standard to meet for ordering installation
of a pen/trap device is lower than the specific and articulable
facts standard of a D order; the government may order the installation if “the information likely to be obtained is relevant to
an ongoing criminal investigation.”124
D. CARPENTER AND A NEW FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
In 2011, after a series of robberies of cell phone and electronics stores in Michigan and Ohio, police arrested a suspect that
told them about several accomplices to the robberies.125 One of
these accomplices was Timothy Carpenter.126 Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d), law enforcement obtained court orders requesting
that MetroPCS and Sprint produce over 150 days of records

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See id. at 151.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127.
See JARRETT ET AL., supra note 108, at 153–54.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
Id.
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showing the location of Carpenter’s cell phone during these robberies.127 These requests produced over 12,000 data points on
Carpenter’s location.128 Law enforcement arrested Carpenter
and charged him with several counts of robbery and carrying a
firearm during a crime of violence.129 The District Court denied
Carpenter’s motion to suppress the cell-site records.130 At trial,
an FBI agent testified about the cell phone location data and
showed maps that illustrated that Carpenter’s phone had been
near the sites of four of the robberies.131 Carpenter was convicted, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding in part that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the historical cell-site location data.132
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. The
Court held that law enforcement collection of seven days of historical cell-site location information (CSLI) was a Fourth
Amendment search, which required a warrant.133 The Court held
first that the information collected invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy, and second, that the third-party doctrine did not govern this case.134 For the purposes of this Note,
there are a number of salient takeaways from the Court’s opinion.
First, in finding that law enforcement’s access to historical
CSLI invaded Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the
Court recognized that it was not merely concerned with movements, but the private personal information one might discover
in knowing about someone’s movements.135 The Court adopted
Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning from her concurrence in United
States v. Jones: “[T]he time-stamped data provides an intimate
window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2212–13.
132. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 890 (6th Cir. 2016) (“In sum,
we hold that the government’s collection of business records containing cell-site
data was not a search under the Fourth Amendment.”), rev’d and remanded,
138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
133. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217.
134. Id. at 2219–20.
135. Id.
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movements, but through them his ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’”136 To wit, the Court
appeared not only concerned by geolocation data but by data generally that can provide a comprehensive picture of a person’s
habits.137
Second, the Court outlined a broad set of attributes about
the data collected and the manner of data collection that it finds
important. Relevant factors include: (1) that the data are “deeply
revealing”; (2) that the data are deep, broad, and comprehensive;
and (3) that the data collection was “inescapable and automatic.”138 Furthermore, the Court expressed a concern about the
cost efficiency of data collection, remarking that collection of historical CSLI is “easy, cheap, and efficient compared to traditional investigative tools.”139
Third, the Court rejected the government’s arguments for
the application of the third-party doctrine in the context of historical CSLI. The Court noted that “seismic shifts in digital technology” undercut the argument in Smith that disclosure of information to a human and to technology were indistinguishable.140
Instead, the Court seemed to say that information that has the
attributes described above is a “distinct category of information”
deserving of special treatment: “Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses. Unlike the nosy neighbor
who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and
their memory is nearly infallible.”141
The Court reasoned that neither the limited intrusion nor
the voluntary exposure justifications of the third-party doctrine
applied to historical CSLI. The Court interpreted Smith and Miller to require an examination of the “nature of the particular documents” sought by law enforcement.142 Because historical CSLI
136. Id. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
137. But see id. at 2219–20 (noting that the Court does have a “special solicitude” for location information).
138. Id. at 2223. Though this Note will refer to these attributes as the Carpenter “factors,” it is important to note that these factors do not constitute a
rigid multi-part test and only represent attributes of CSLI that the court considered important. For a more comprehensive look into each of these factors, see
Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357
(2019).
139. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
140. Id. at 2219.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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gave law enforcement easy access to comprehensive chronicle of
a person’s movements, it was not the same as the checks in Miller or the telephone logs in Smith.143 Access to historical CSLI
could not therefore be a limited intrusion.
Further, the voluntary exposure rationale was suspect. The
Court recognized that the use of a cell phone had become “indispensable to participation in modern society” and that “[v]irtually
any activity” on a phone generated CSLI.144 Because a phone automatically generated CSLI, often with no “affirmative act” on
the part of the user, users were not voluntarily exposing their
physical location in any “meaningful sense.”145
Finally, the Court concluded that because access to historical CSLI constituted a Fourth Amendment search, law enforcement must obtain a warrant founded upon probable cause before
accessing historical CSLI.146 Though the Court recognized that
there may be situations where law enforcement may not be required to obtain a warrant, like responding to an emergency, the
Court concluded that a warrant was required in the “mine-run
criminal investigation.”147
II. PRIVACY OF INTERNET HISTORY IS CURRENTLY
INADEQUATELY PROTECTED
This Part will show that lower courts are shying away from
a broad application of the reasoning of Carpenter, leaving internet history under-protected. First, this Part will show that decisions in the wake of Carpenter have focused on physical location
and the specific factual circumstances of Carpenter itself instead
of applying the reasoning of the decision. Next, this Part will
suggest that this lack of extension is not only a missed opportunity but leaves internet history insufficiently protected from
government intrusion. Finally, this Part will attempt to illustrate the value of internet privacy and explain why it might deserve greater protections in a democratic society.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 2220.
Id.
Id. at 2221.
Id. at 2223.
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A. COURTS ARE RELUCTANT TO BROADLY EXTEND CARPENTER
TO THE INTERNET
Though many initial cases following Carpenter did not have
to consider its applicability to new facts owing to the good faith
exception,148 cases have increasingly had to confront Carpenter’s
applicability to new sets of facts. But courts have hesitated to
extend Carpenter to facts not dealt with in the opinion, including
government collection of pole camera footage,149 real-time GPS
location information,150 and utility records.151 A few cases bear
directly on the question considered in this Note: whether Carpenter can be read to apply to internet history information, including information that associates an individual with an IP address.
In United States v. Contreras, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether Carpenter applied when an ISP provided an IP address
that identified where a person resides.152 In Contreras, law enforcement discovered that a computer associated with an IP address had uploaded “sexually graphic images” of children to Kik,
an internet messaging service.153 Law enforcement discovered
that Frontier Communications, an ISP, had provided the IP address to one of their users, and the Northern District of Florida
issued a grand jury subpoena to Frontier for the subscriber information associated with the IP address.154 Frontier gave law
enforcement the information, including the home address of the
subscriber.155 Based on this information, a court granted a
search warrant for the residence.156 Law enforcement executed

148. Nathaniel Sobel, Four Months Later, How Are Courts Interpreting Carpenter?, LAWFARE (Oct. 18, 2018, 8:57 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/four
-months-later-how-are-courts-interpreting-carpenter
[https://perma.cc/8SS2-5HPN].
149. United States v. Kubasiak, No. 18-CR-120-PP, 2018 WL 4846761, at *6
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 2018); United States v. Tirado, No. 16-CR-168, 2018 WL
3995901, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 21, 2018).
150. State v. Sylvestre, 254 So. 3d 986, 989–90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
151. United States v. Lightfoot, No. CR 17-0274, 2018 WL 4376509, at *6
(W.D. La. Aug. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CR 17-0274,
2018 WL 4374196 (W.D. La. Sept. 13, 2018).
152. 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018).
153. Id. at 855.
154. Id. at 855–56.
155. Id. at 856.
156. Id.
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the warrant and discovered numerous videos depicting the sexual abuse of children.157 The resident, Sebastian Contreras, was
arrested, charged, and convicted of transportation and receipt of
child pornography.158
Contreras argued on appeal that, considering Carpenter,
law enforcement should have obtained a warrant to get the subscriber information from Frontier.159 The Fifth Circuit quickly
dismissed this attempt to extend Carpenter.160 Judge Higginson
wrote that this information fell “comfortably within the scope of
the third-party doctrine.”161 Though the court acknowledged
that Carpenter limited the power of the third-party doctrine, the
court read Carpenter to require that the information collected
bear on a person’s “day-to-day movement.”162 The information
provided to law enforcement only indicated Contreras’s presence
at his residence and nowhere else.163 Thus, Carpenter did not apply.164
Numerous courts have reached similar results.165 Courts
have rejected applying Carpenter to IP addresses and subscriber

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 856–57.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. The First Circuit also concluded that third-party doctrine continued to
apply to IP address information after Carpenter. United States v. Hood, 920
F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A]n internet user generates the IP address data
that the government acquired from Kik in this case only by making the affirmative decision to access a website or application. By contrast, as the Supreme
Court noted in Carpenter, every time a cell phone receives a call, text message,
or email, the cell phone pings CSLI to the nearest cell site tower without the
cell phone user lifting a finger. . . . Thus, the government’s warrantless acquisition from Kik of the IP address data at issue here in no way gives rise to the
unusual concern that the Supreme Court identified in Carpenter . . . . Accordingly, we conclude that Hood did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information that the government acquired from Kik without a warrant.”).
The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have also declined to extend Carpenter to IP
address information, albeit in non-precedential opinions. United States v.
VanDyck, 776 F. App’x 495, 496 (9th Cir. 2019) (“VanDyck argues that the evidence should be suppressed because the Fourth Amendment required a warrant
to obtain the subscriber information associated with the IP address . . . . [W]e
decline to extend Carpenter to encompass the argument advanced by
VanDyck.”); United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, No. 18-4573, 2019 WL
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information because the information is not detailed enough,166
not a comprehensive account of day-to-day movement,167 or because Carpenter itself remarked that it was a narrow decision.168
Some courts have cited all three reasons.169
Though most courts have been skeptical about extending
Carpenter to cover digital footprints, one decision in the District
Court of Rhode Island seemed to recognize the possibility that
2474025, at *2 (4th Cir. June 13, 2019) (per curiam) (“Wellbeloved-Stone contends that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his IP address and
subscriber information after Carpenter . . . . The Court explicitly emphasized
the narrow scope of its holding, and Wellbeloved-Stone cites no post-Carpenter
authority extending Carpenter’s rationale to IP addresses or subscriber information.” (citation omitted)). Many federal district courts and some state courts
have been similarly unpersuaded. See, e.g., infra notes 166–70.
166. United States v. McCutchin, No. CR-17-01517-001-TUC-JAS (BPV),
2019 WL 1075544, at *2 (D. Ariz. Mar. 7, 2019) (“The internet subscriber information differs drastically from the CSLI obtained in Carpenter. It provides business records that are not detailed or encyclopedic. Subscriber information does
not reveal familial, political, professional, religious, sexual associations, or location.”); United States v. Tolbert, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1225 (D.N.M. 2018) (“The
privacy interest in this type of identifying data, which presumably any AOL or
CenturyLink employee could access during the regular course of business,
simply does not rise to the level of the evidence in Carpenter such that it would
require law enforcement to obtain a search warrant.”).
167. Brown v. Sprint Corp. Sec. Specialist, No. 17-CV-2561(JS)(ARL), 2019
WL 418100, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) (“Carpenter focuses on the intrusion
of tracking a person’s physical movements, which Plaintiff does not allege is at
issue here.”); see also United States v. Germain, No. 2:18-cr-00026, 2019 WL
1970779, at *4 (D. Vt. May 3, 2019); United States v. Jenkins, No. 1:18-cr-00181,
2019 WL 1568154, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 11, 2019); United States v. Popa, 369 F.
Supp. 3d 833, 838 (N.D. Ohio 2019); United States v. Streett, 363 F. Supp. 3d
1212, 1309 (D.N.M. 2018); United States v. Gregory, No. 8:18CR139, 2018 WL
6427871, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2018); People v. Sime, 88 N.Y.S.3d 823, 826 (N.Y.
Crim. Ct. 2018).
168. Cryer v. Idaho Dep’t of Labor, No. 1:16-cv-00526-BLW, 2018 WL
3636529, at *1 n.1 (D. Idaho July 30, 2018); United States v. Westley, No. 3:17CR-171 (MPS), 2018 WL 3448161, at *14 n.9 (D. Conn. July 17, 2018).
169. United States v. Felton, 367 F. Supp. 3d 569, 575 (W.D. La. 2019) (“Felton’s use of the IP address is not so closely related to his ‘home’ that the Court
can say that there is a privacy interest as to his papers and personal effects.
Second, the logs obtained from the USPS do not track Felton’s every movement
of every day; they only identify the fact that Felton was tracking the packages.
The Court further recognizes the very narrow ruling in Carpenter and finds that
it does not govern this case. Thus, the Court concludes that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the information provided by Comcast (Felton’s IP address) and the content of the communication between Felton’s IP address and the USPS server.”); see also United States v. Therrien, No. 2:18-cr00085, 2019 WL 1147479, at *2 (D. Vt. Mar. 13, 2019).
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Carpenter could apply to “exhaustive chronicle[s]” of digital activities and not just to physical activities.170 In United States v.
Monroe, law enforcement obtained a D order requesting that a
website disclose the IP addresses of users that had downloaded
video files depicting child pornography.171 Law enforcement, using publicly available information on the internet, then learned
which ISP issued these IP addresses and subpoenaed subscriber
information to learn the identity of the users, including one Jordan Monroe.172 Using this information, law enforcement obtained a search warrant for Monroe’s residence and discovered a
collection of child pornography.173
Monroe moved to exclude the evidence of his IP address obtained via the D order, arguing that the Carpenter reasoning
should apply to IP addresses.174 The court rejected this argument, observing that an IP address is more like the information
in Smith and Miller.175 “An IP address,” the court argued, “is one
link held by a third party in a chain of information that may lead
to a particular person. It does not reveal the kind of minutely
detailed, historical portrait of ‘the whole of [a person’s] physical
movements’ that concerned the Supreme Court in Carpenter . . . .”176 But the court appears to have based its holding on its
perception that law enforcement could glean little information
from an IP address without further investigation.177 The Monroe
court seemingly recognized that if digital information, even information outside of CSLI, reached a certain level of intrusiveness, the Carpenter analysis could be appropriate.178
The Monroe court’s willingness to even consider digital activities under the framework of Carpenter is a rarity. Most courts
continue to dismiss the possibility that IP addresses and subscriber information are subject to Carpenter’s new Fourth
Amendment analysis. Although commentators expressed that

170. United States v. Monroe, 350 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48 (D.R.I. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206,
2219 (2018)).
171. Id. at 44–45.
172. Id. at 44.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 49.
176. Id. (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018)).
177. See id. at 48.
178. See id.
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Carpenter could have been a watershed moment for digital privacy, the current trend in the courts locks in the existing inadequate privacy schemes.
B. INTERNET HISTORY IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTED BY
CURRENT PRIVACY SCHEMES
Three concerns demonstrate that internet privacy may be in
a precarious spot under current privacy schemes. First, the use
of internet history information by law enforcement shows no
signs of slowing and companies are not providing a meaningful
check on information provided to law enforcement. Transparency reports by Google,179 Twitter,180 Facebook,181 and large
ISPs182 all show that they continue to receive thousands of requests from law enforcement for information. In most cases, a
company will provide at least some user information in response
to a government request.183 Though companies may often have
incentives to protect user information and perhaps comply minimally with these requests,184 companies are still providing the
government with user information which threatens a user’s privacy.

179. Requests for User Information – Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/user-data/overview?hl=en [https://perma
.cc/9X7Y-AXF8].
180. United States of America, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com/
en/countries/us.html [https://perma.cc/T4XH-YPT4].
181. Requests for User Data – United States, FACEBOOK,
https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests/country/US (last
visited Mar. 6, 2019).
182. COMCAST TRANSPARENCY REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2018 – JUNE 30, 2018
(2018), https://update.comcast.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/33/dlm_uploads/
2018/12/Comcast-Tenth-Transparency-Report-FINAL-Dec-2018-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6MD5-W3Q8]; Transparency Report, AT&T, https://about.att
.com/csr/home/frequently-requested-info/governance/transparencyreport.html
[https://perma.cc/9HT2-39RD]; see also Transparency Reporting Index, ACCESS
NOW, https://www.accessnow.org/transparency-reporting-index/ [https://perma
.cc/8LSG-8VPQ] (last updated 2016).
183. See, e.g., Requests for User Data – United States, supra note 181 (showing that Facebook provided the government with some user information in response to 86% of requests).
184. See generally Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70
STAN. L. REV. 99 (2018) (explaining that companies that serve as “surveillance
intermediaries” between the government and a user often have financial and
ideological incentives that do not align with government interests).
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Second, while the SCA and the PTS would seem to provide
some protections for internet users, the protections are very limited. All so-called non-content information can be obtained from
a provider under a reasonable suspicion standard, and pen/trap
devices may be installed on a showing of mere relevance.185 Even
though law enforcement may often possess more than probable
cause in internet investigations when they seek to obtain additional information,186 the increased use of the internet for all
kinds of daily communication and transactions will increase incentives for law enforcement to argue for access to large portions
of a suspect’s internet history.187
Third, even if the SCA and PTS were protective, the statutes
lack real bite in the event they are not followed. Suppression of
evidence is not available for nonconstitutional violations of the
SCA or PTS.188 Because most conduct under these statutes
would not constitute a search,189 a suspect that demonstrated
that the government had not made the proper showing, but received the court order anyways, could not then exclude the evidence. Thus, a person subject to internet surveillance lacks protection at the front and back end of the search.190

185. See supra Part I.C.2.
186. Cf. Paul Ohm, Probably Probable Cause: The Diminishing Importance
of Justification Standards, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1514 (2010). Professor Ohm argues
that the justification standards (probable cause, reasonable suspicion, and the
like) matter less in internet investigations where law enforcement is less likely
to encounter a naked IP address in the wild. Id. Importantly, Ohm notes that
fishing expeditions are one area where justification standards are likely to remain significant. Id. at 1550.
187. See Jennifer Stisa Granick, If the Government Had Its Way, Everything
Could Be Wiretapped, ACLU (Feb. 19, 2019, 10:30 AM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/if-government-had-its-way
-everything-could-be-wiretapped [https://perma.cc/99BL-38LV].
188. 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (2012) (“The remedies and sanctions described in this
chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for nonconstitutional violations of this chapter.”); see United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th
Cir. 2008) (citing several cases for the proposition that violations of the Acts do
not merit exclusion of evidence).
189. See supra Part I.C.1.
190. This Note argues that protection on the front end is important. For a
compelling argument (one that this author agrees with) that the exclusionary
rule should be added statutorily to protect the back end of the search, see Orin
S. Kerr, Lifting the “Fog” of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (2003).
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C. A LOSS OF INTERNET PRIVACY IS HARMFUL TO SOCIETY
The Fourth Amendment and its protections are at the heart
of American democracy. In 18th-century America, colonists had
become excellent smugglers and pirates, defying the Crown’s attempts to mandate that the colonies only trade with Britain.191
In response, the Crown authorized writs of assistance.192 A writ
of assistance allowed agents of the Crown to search broadly for
smuggled goods without “a sworn declaration, notice, or probable
cause.”193 In a five-hour oration before the Massachusetts State
House, a young lawyer named James Otis, Jr. disputed the legality of the writs in defense of fifty-three Boston merchants.194
Otis called the writs the “worst instrument of arbitrary power,
the most destructive of English liberty . . . that was ever found
in an English law-book.”195 Otis lost his case.196 But John Adams,
an audience member to Otis’s oration would later write in a letter to William Tudor: “Then and there, the child independence
was born.”197
Otis’s words in opposition to the writs of assistance loom
large in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.198 There is clear doctrinal support for this conception of privacy. But merely because
citizens have challenged government conduct in the past does
not necessarily mean that the same issues pervade today. Indeed, numerous reports on the “death” of privacy suggest that
people may not possess the concerns that Otis had with governmental overreach.199 Because privacy is a notoriously slippery

191. Philip Foglia, The Lawyer Who Lit the Fuse of the American Revolution,
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J., Mar./Apr. 2015, at 26, 26.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 27.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 28.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625
(1886).
199. See, e.g., Geoff Duncan, Zuckerberg: Online Privacy Is Not a “Social
Norm,” DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 11, 2010, 9:32 AM), https://www.digitaltrends
.com/social-media/zuckerberg-online-privacy-is-not-a-social-norm/
[https://perma.cc/3HMW-GK9A]; John H. Fleming & Amy Adkins, Data Security: Not a Big Concern for Millennials, GALLUP (June 9, 2016), https://news
.gallup.com/businessjournal/192401/data-security-not-big-concern-millennials
.aspx [https://perma.cc/SZ65-CR7C] (“[M]illennials are the generation that is
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concept200 and because there may be some question of its value
in a digital age,201 mounting a defense of internet privacy may
help elucidate why we might want to preserve it even if we are
not diehard Otis-ites.
The right of privacy was famously described by Justice Louis
Brandeis as “the right to be let alone.”202 Alan F. Westin expanded upon this definition in his influential treatise on privacy,
describing privacy as the ability to control “when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others.”203 For Westin, the individual’s ability to control disclosure
of information about them to certain parties and society writ
large fostered four interrelated functions for individuals in a democracy: personal autonomy, emotional release, self-evaluation,
and limited and protected communication.204 The relevant aspects of these functions for internet privacy are considered below.
Personal autonomy is the ability to “avoid being manipulated or dominated wholly by others.”205 For Westin, democracies
recognize that human dignity requires that humans be able to

most trusting of institutions to safeguard their personal data.”); Is Online Privacy Over?, CTR. FOR DIGITAL FUTURE (Apr. 22, 2013), https://www
.digitalcenter.org/online-privacy-and-millennials-0413/ [https://perma.cc/2RP2
-RD7U]; Eric Limer, CES 2018’s Hot New Trend: The Total Death of Privacy,
POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/security/a15045965/2018s-hot-new-tech-trend-is-the-death-of
-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/C3PN-B97Q]; Alex Preston, The Death of Privacy,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 3, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/03/
internet-death-privacy-google-facebook-alex-preston [https://perma.cc/MW8N
-4YJ7]. Privacy’s death has likely been greatly exaggerated. See DAVID GRAY,
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN AN AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 14 (2017) (“Everyone
values privacy. Different people just draw different boundaries. That is true
even of millennials.”).
200. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1–8 (2008) (arguing
privacy rights arguments often fail due to a failure to fully conceptualize privacy); see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1935 (2013) (“[O]ur society lacks an understanding of why (and when)
government surveillance is harmful.”).
201. See supra note 199.
202. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
203. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
204. Id. at 32.
205. Id. at 33.
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preserve and protect a “core” of individuality.206 Further, development of independent and diverse thought requires that humans be able to experiment in private.207 A lack of privacy could
have a levelling effect, leaving people afraid to express thoughts
too far outside the mainstream.208
Societies must also allow individuals the opportunity for
emotional release. People play different social roles in different
situations, each coming with their own sets of expectations and
permitted behaviors.209 Westin argues that not only do people
need time off from playing their different social roles, it is necessary to have enough privacy to complain about others.210 People
should have enough privacy, Westin argues, such that they can
express commentary that is not First Amendment-protected
speech, commentary that is “wholly unfair, frivolous, nasty, and
libelous.”211 This serves as a “safety-valve” in a democracy, allowing people to complain about authority in private while developing measured speech for public presentation.212 Moreover,
privacy in this domain allows society to accommodate minor infractions of the law.213 Whereas society may be forced to take
action if it knew of all lawbreaking behavior, a hardy right to
privacy allows the state to place minor infractions or mere suspicions of lawbreaking beyond its cognition.214
Further, privacy is necessary for self-evaluation to occur.
The ability to “integrate” one’s experiences in private not only
facilitates creative thought but allows people to measure their

206. Id.
207. Id. at 34.
208. Cf. FOUCAULT, supra note 1, at 202–03 (“He who is subjected to a field
of visibility, and who know it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of
power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself
the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the
principle of his own subjection.”). For an argument that the revelation of online
pornography preferences could have this type of levelling effect, further disciplining the difference of already marginalized groups, see Elena Maris et al.,
Tracking Sex: The Implications of Widespread Sexual Data Leakage and Tracking on Porn Websites 5–7 (July 15, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1907.06520.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NCG-T7ZD].
209. See WESTIN, supra note 203, at 35.
210. See id. at 35–36.
211. Id. at 36.
212. Id. at 35–36.
213. Id. at 35.
214. Id.
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performance against their personal ideals.215 For Westin, the
ability to take “moral inventory” of one’s actions in private brings
the “conscience into play,” allowing people to improve themselves.216
Finally, privacy allows for limited and protected communication. The ability to choose the subject, extent, and recipient of
one’s disclosures permits individuals to maintain relationships
and guard their associations with “doctors, lawyers, ministers,
psychiatrists, psychologists, and others.”217 Anonymity in communication and action can allow better testing of ideas and prevent unwanted government intrusion.218
These functions are active on the internet. People express
themselves on the internet; they make associations with political
groups; they buy things; they seek legal, medical, or spiritual advice. In other corners of the internet, people are “trolls,” “individual[s] who post[] false accusations or inflammatory remarks on
social media to promote a cause or to harass someone.”219 Where
this conduct is anonymous or is otherwise known to limited parties and does not rise to the level of major criminal activity, it
promotes Westin’s functions. The choice of which forum to express oneself in should not significantly modify Westin’s analysis.220 Against all odds, even internet trolls can serve a democratic function.
Carpenter’s rationale appears to recognize Westin’s basic
functions of privacy. Facts of modern life have allowed companies to amass lengthy histories of internet users’ activities, containing sensitive information about a user’s beliefs, thoughts,

215. Id. at 36–37.
216. Id. at 37.
217. Id. at 38.
218. See id. at 31–32.
219. Definition of: Internet Troll, PCMAG.COM, https://www.pcmag.com/
encyclopedia/term/68609/internet-troll [https://perma.cc/X65Y-LSQM].
220. Though, the potential existence of a privacy paradox may complicate
matters. Some research has suggested that people make decisions regarding
their privacy online that does not square with their attitudes and intentions
toward privacy. See Susanne Barth & Menno D.T. de Jong, The Privacy Paradox
– Investigating Discrepancies Between Expressed Privacy Concerns and Actual
Online Behavior – A Systematic Literature Review, 34 TELEMATICS & INFORMATICS 1038 (2017). These decisions may not be entirely rational—people may be
aware that the costs of their online behavior outweigh the benefits and perform
risky online behaviors anyways. Id. at 1039.
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and desires. Mere participation in communication over the internet should not mean you have forever forfeited privacy in your
internet history.
III. COURTS CAN AND SHOULD EXTEND CARPENTER TO
PROTECT INTERNET HISTORY
This Part will argue that lower courts can and should extend
Carpenter to cover historical records of non-content internet history, real-time monitoring of the same content, and disclosure of
basic subscriber information. This Part will first note that Carpenter is likely broader than its assertedly narrow holding and
lay out a theory by which courts could extend Carpenter to require a warrant for certain kinds of internet history. This Part
will then examine the three scenarios described above and argue
that courts could reasonably extend Carpenter to apply to these
scenarios. Finally, this Part will contend that the best way to
extend Carpenter to cover these scenarios is to impose a warrant
requirement when the government seeks to collect information
falling into these categories.
A. CARPENTER CAN BE BROADER THAN ITS NARROW HOLDING
In Carpenter, Chief Justice Roberts wrote in no uncertain
terms about the bounds of the Court’s opinion: “Our decision today is a narrow one. We do not express a view on matters not
before us.”221 Roberts says that the Court’s opinion does not disturb Smith or Miller and does not “call into question conventional surveillance techniques.”222 As noted above,223 this language has left lower courts understandably squeamish when
faced with the prospect of applying the Carpenter factors to new
factual situations. This Note freely admits that courts are well
within their authority to refuse to apply Carpenter beyond its
explicit holding.
Yet most everyone writing about Carpenter thinks that
when the Court says seven days of historical cell-site location
information,224 it means more than seven days of historical cellsite location information.”225 Rehashing all of the arguments
221. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part II.B.
224. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
225. See, e.g., ORIN S. KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2019); Jennifer A. Brobst, The Metal Eye: Ethical Regulation of the State’s
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here is unnecessary. The volume of scholarship says that the
Court has reiterated that digital is different, and that this decision sets out a framework which the Court will use in the future
to scope Fourth Amendment searches. The Court itself has admonished lower courts that have “mechanical[ly]” adhered to
precedent when applying the Fourth Amendment to digital contexts.226 Because Carpenter has provided a framework for a decision that calls into question the third-party doctrine,227 extensions beyond its explicit holding are justified—the Court has
signaled a departure from precedent.228
But even though the extension of Carpenter may be justified,
it does not necessarily follow that lower courts should be the actor to accomplish this task. After all, Congress could merely
amend the relevant statutes229 to require warrant protections for
obtaining internet history information and provide for an exclusionary remedy. Indeed, there is a powerful argument that Congress is in the best position to balance the competing interests in
the privacy analysis, especially when it comes to changing technology.230
Congress, however, does not appear to be up to the task.
First, congressional efforts to update the ECPA have historically
Use of Surveillance Technology and Artificial Intelligence to Observe Humans in
Confinement, 55 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 24 (2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Comment,
A Poor Mother’s Right to Privacy: A Review, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1164 (2018);
Christine Guest, Comment, DNA and Law Enforcement: How the Use of Open
Source DNA Databases Violates Privacy Rights, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1015, 1044
(2019); Grace Manning, Alexa: Can You Keep A Secret? The Third-Party Doctrine in the Age of the Smart Home, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2019);
Ohm, supra note 138, at 361–66; Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.F. 943, 943–44 (2019); Wouter Zwart,
Note, Slow Your Roll Out of Body-Worn Cameras: Privacy Concerns and the
Tension Between Transparency and Surveillance in Arizona, 60 ARIZ. L. REV.
783, 799 n.112 (2018).
226. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
227. See supra Part I.D.
228. For a discussion of why lower courts are justified in “narrowing from
below” outdated precedents, see Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016). Though as admitted above, the
“best” reading of Carpenter is likely its explicit holding on historical CSLI, it is
still within reason to read the Court’s framework as applying to other categories
of digital information as it is written so broadly.
229. See supra Part I.C.2.
230. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 806
(2004) (arguing that the legislative branch should create the “primary investigative rules when technology is changing”).
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stalled, despite strong support from industry and civil liberties
groups.231 Second, while political will may exist to provide privacy protections against corporate surveillance of user information in the wake of various scandals involving Facebook, the
same may not be true of efforts to restrict government surveillance.232 Recent changes to privacy legislation have gone in the
other direction, ratifying, and in some cases, expanding government surveillance power.233 Courts, therefore, must step in and
fulfill their constitutional duty to protect against overreaches by
the political branches.234
B. EXTENSION OF CARPENTER: THREE SCENARIOS
If lower courts accept that Carpenter’s reasoning can apply
beyond seven days of historical cell-site location information,
then they need a test to apply to new sets of facts. This Note proposes that if digital data sought meet the factors set out in Carpenter, then a court should hold that law enforcement conduct to
obtain data constitutes a search.235 Consistent with Carpenter,
this finding should not be a case-by-case determination based on
whether an invasion of privacy actually occurred, but a determination based on the type of data sought. Further, because Carpenter reiterates the proposition that inferences do not insulate
a search,236 a court determining whether a Carpenter search has
231. Mike Orcutt, Why Congress Can’t Seem To Fix This 30-Year-Old Law
Governing Your Electronic Data, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 17, 2017) https://www
.technologyreview.com/s/603636/why-congress-cant-seem-to-fix-this-30-yearold-law-governing-your-electronic-data/ [https://perma.cc/3JED-FNVW].
232. Louise Matsakis, SCOTUS and Congress Leave the Right to Privacy Up
For Grabs, WIRED (July 3, 2018, 11:49 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/scotus
-congress-leave-right-to-privacy-up-for-grabs/ [https://perma.cc/9PV2-LRZV].
233. See Louise Matsakis, Congress Renews Warrantless Surveillance—and
Makes It Even Worse, WIRED (Jan. 11, 2018, 4:19 PM), https://www.wired.com/
story/fisa-section-702-renewal-congress/ [https://perma.cc/5MAH-8LAW].
234. See GRAY, supra note 199, at 14; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he courts of justice are to be
considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”).
235. There is an alternative theory based on bailment of digital information
that the Court might also support, which is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
brief discussion of this theory, see Ohm, supra note 138, at 36. Another alternative approach to remedying the problems with the third-party doctrine is considered earlier in this volume. See Wayne A. Logan & Jake Linford, Contracting
for Fourth Amendment Privacy Online, 104 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2019) (arguing
that contract law could inform the Fourth Amendment analysis).
236. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2218 (2018).
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occurred must look at all of the sensitive information that may
be compromised by tying a person to a particular collection of
internet activity.
Both Professors Ohm and Kerr have argued that implementing Carpenter would likely cover some internet history records.237 Neither go far enough with their analysis. This Section
will argue that while Ohm and Kerr are correct to recognize that
IP addresses of the websites a user visits should be protected
under the rationale of Carpenter, similar logic should extend this
rationale to cover both real-time monitoring of the same information and basic subscriber information that can in effect tie a
person to a set of internet activity.
The contours of Carpenter remain fuzzy even as to how it
protects historical cell-site location information. Extension of the
reasoning thus presents even greater challenges. The following
three scenarios will attempt to provide some guidance as to what
extension of Carpenter’s reasoning to collection of internet history could look like.
1. Scenario One: A Court Order Requires an ISP or Website
To Disclose Historical Information About a User
In In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 2703(d), the government sought information from Twitter about a variety of parties, including Chelsea Manning, Julian
Assange, and Wikileaks.238 The government obtained an ex parte
order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) requesting Twitter disclose the
subscriber information for accounts “registered to or associated
with” these parties (among others) as well as “records of user
activity for any connections made to or from the Account[s].”239
The Eastern District of Virginia denied a Fourth Amendment
challenge to the order, holding that the parties lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in IP address information.240
One could imagine similar cases where law enforcement has
something more than a hunch241 about someone’s suspected
criminal activity but less than probable cause. Under current

237. KERR, supra note 225 (manuscript at 46–48); Ohm, supra note 138, at
378–80.
238. 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 121 (E.D. Va. 2011).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 138.
241. See supra Part I.C.2 (exploring the current standards for requesting
non-content information).
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law, law enforcement can subpoena large swaths of that user’s
internet activity from ISPs or websites to prove their case.242
This situation should fall squarely within the Carpenter factors.243 First, the data are deeply revealing. As described above,
a collection of IP addresses that a person accessed essentially
provides a history of that person’s internet activity.244 This activity may reveal sensitive information about a person’s life.245
Second, the data are deep, broad, and comprehensive. ISPs may
keep years of records of a user’s connections to other IP addresses.246
Third, collection of these data is inescapable and automatic.
IP addresses are assigned to computers and required to facilitate
communication between computers.247 Like cell-site location information, IP addresses operate behind the scenes such that
turning them over could hardly be considered voluntary. There
is a colorable argument that a user volunteers IP address information when they visit a webpage,248 but this misreads Carpenter.249 The Carpenter Court, noting that cell phones become “indispensable to participation in modern society,” expressed a
concern that “virtually any activity” on a phone would generate
CSLI and thus required voluntary disclosure in a “meaningful
sense.”250 Though the Court noted that automatic data connections made by the phone bolstered its argument, the Court did
not so finely parse cell phone activities into voluntary and automatic. Instead, the Court swept all CSLI generated by a cell
phone into its analysis. Similarly, the internet is a critical part
of modern society. And, like CSLI, a user creates IP address information by virtually any activity on the internet.251 It is difficult to distinguish between the two on this Carpenter factor.
Fourth, the ability to collect these data is a massive efficiency gain for law enforcement. There is no precise historical
242. See supra Part I.C.2.
243. See supra Part I.D.
244. See supra Part I.A.
245. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
246. See Ohm, supra note 17.
247. Titus, supra note 26.
248. See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (“[A]n
internet user generates the IP address data . . . only by making the affirmative
decision to access a website or application.”).
249. See supra notes 144–47 and accompanying text.
250. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).
251. See supra Part I.A.
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analog to the type of information law enforcement have access to
with internet histories. IP addresses may reveal detailed histories of a person’s plans and predilections unobtainable by traditional surveillance tools without a warrant.
Thus, each Carpenter factor supports treating historical IP
address information like historical CSLI. Courts should reject
the myopic view of interpreting Carpenter as only pertaining to
location information; obtaining IP address information can be as,
or in many cases more, intrusive than historical CSLI.
2. Scenario Two: A Pen/Trap Device Captures Real-Time
Information About a User’s Internet Activities
This scenario is the one encountered in the introduction to
this Note. As a part of the investigation of Ulbricht, law enforcement installed five pen/trap devices to track the internet activity
to and from Ulbricht’s home router.252 The orders authorizing
the installation of the devices allowed law enforcement to collect
source and destination IP addresses, with “dates, times, durations, [and] ports of transmission.”253
The information obtained is no different than the information obtained in scenario one. The difference here is that the
information obtained with a pen/trap device is obtained in real
time instead of as a prefigured collection.254 An open question
remains about whether the Carpenter factors apply to data collection in real time.255 In the case of pen/trap devices to collect
internet activity, they should; the kind of information collected
is identical to that sought in Scenario One.
Even courts placing an emphasis on the durational limit expressed in Carpenter should find no difficulty here because a
pen/trap order must specify the length of time the order will
last.256 Thus, the historical and real-time situations are function-

252. United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2017).
253. Id.
254. See supra Part I.C.2.
255. Cf. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (noting that the Court is not addressing real-time CSLI).
256. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c) (2012). But do note that the appropriate inquiry
here is not whether there is some arbitrary durational limit that determines
when privacy has actually been invaded, but whether the surveillance allows
access to the kinds of information that fall under the Carpenter factors. The
duration should only be relevant to the analysis if it would change the type of
information requested by the government.
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ally indistinguishable; a lump sum invasion of privacy is no different than a day-by-day invasion.257 The Carpenter Court expressed a concern with data collected over a span of seven
days.258 Most pen/trap cases are likely to exceed this span. The
statutory scheme for obtaining a pen/trap device allows and anticipates collection of up to four months of information.259 This
fact would likely obviate the need for a lower court to confront
whether there is some period under seven days where a search
does not occur.
In the rare case where the government seeks to obtain less
than a week of real-time internet activity and the lower court
was focused on the seven-day cap in Carpenter, courts may still
be justified in finding a Fourth Amendment search. The distance
someone can travel in a day is limited by their access to transportation; the distance someone can travel on the internet is limited only by how fast they can click. The average adult spends
5.9 hours a day with digital media, including smartphones, desktops, laptops, streaming devices and gaming devices.260 It is possible to visit numerous websites in those 5.9 hours, creating a
detailed picture of the person using the device. Thus, the privacy
concerns still exist in real-time collection of internet history even
if it is over a seemingly short amount of time.

257. In other words, seven days of information is seven days of information
regardless of whether it is collected all at once or piece by piece. A few courts
have already forecasted that eventually real-time and historical CSLI may be
subject to the same probable cause requirement. United States v. Chavez, No.
15-CR-00285-LHK, 2019 WL 1003357, at *4–6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019) (stating
that eventually historical and real-time CSLI may be treated similarly as realtime collection may pose a greater threat to privacy); cf. United States v. Gibson,
No. 3:18-CR-033, 2019 WL 2265370, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 28, 2019) (assuming
that probable cause standard must be met for government to obtain order for
real-time CSLI over 30-day period, just as a court would for historical CSLI).
258. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2234.
259. 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c) (2012); see also Brief of Reason Foundation et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 25, Ulbricht v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2708 (2018) (No. 17-950), 2018 WL 776098.
260. Rob Marvin, Tech Addiction by the Numbers: How Much Time We
Spend Online, PCMAG.COM (June 11, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.pcmag.com/
article/361587/tech-addiction-by-the-numbers-how-much-time-we-spend-online
[https://perma.cc/8DQU-MTVN].
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3. Scenario Three: A Subpoena Allows Law Enforcement To
Obtain Basic Subscriber Information Associated with an IP
Address
A common occurrence in child pornography prosecutions is
that law enforcement officials will discover through investigation that a computer has viewed or downloaded illicit materials,
but law enforcement will only have the IP address associated
with that computer.261 For example, in United States v. Perez,
the FBI received a complaint from a woman who claimed a Yahoo! user had sent her images of children engaged in sexual
acts.262 The FBI subpoenaed Yahoo! for the user’s IP address and
was able to determine that Time Warner Cable had issued the
IP address.263 The FBI then subpoenaed Time Warner for the
user information associated with that IP address, including the
user’s address.264 This subpoena revealed that Time Warner had
issued the IP address to Javier Perez.265 Using this information
combined with a public records check, the FBI obtained and executed a search warrant on Perez’s home and found over 4,000
compact discs of child pornography.266
Courts applying Carpenter should hold that both of these requests would be searches. This is admittedly the most tenuous
extension of Carpenter; there are good arguments that obtaining
basic subscriber information alone does not reveal the same
things about a person’s conduct online that obtaining a record of
their history does.267 But Carpenter and the Court’s technology
exceptionalism requires that access to data following the search
plays a role in deciding whether the initial conduct is a search, a
concept Professor Kerr has termed “downstream analysis.”268
261. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 484 F.3d 735, 738 (5th Cir. 2007); Commonwealth v. Martinez, 71 N.E.3d 105, 108 (Mass. 2017); Christy v. Commonwealth, No. 0169-17-3, 2018 WL 1720750, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2018).
262. Perez, 484 F.3d at 738. Perez is not a case that challenges whether the
FBI performed a search in subpoenaing Perez’s records, but it is illustrative of
the factual situation commonly encountered in these prosecutions.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See KERR, supra note 225 (manuscript at 47–48) (“A person’s assigned
IP address does not reveal much about them. It changes over time, but in ways
that generally don’t give a detailed picture of their lives.”).
268. See id. (manuscript at 49) (“The prospect of what can be revealed when
a record is combined with other unprotected records may determine if one or
both of the records is something Carpenter protects.”); cf. Kyllo v. United States,
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This downstream analysis reveals that Professor Kerr’s conclusion about subscriber records not being protected should fall.
Even where the information requested from an ISP or a website
does not provide a history of a person’s internet activity, law enforcement can use this information to tie a person to internet
activity, either through additional legal process or basic internet
searches. If a person has used the same username across multiple websites or uses websites that use IP addresses as an identifier,269 a Google search of this person’s IP address or username
will likely reveal a great history of that person’s activity. Such a
holding would not require that a court set a limit on the permissible amount of information that the downstream searches could
reveal,270 but merely to conclude that the total risk is unreasonable.
Such a holding and rationale would not be unknown in jurisprudence. In R. v. Spencer, a 2014 Supreme Court of Canada
case, police arrested Matthew David Spencer for possessing child
pornography.271 In investigating a peer-to-peer file sharing system, police obtained an IP address that had downloaded child
pornography.272 In accordance with Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, police requested basic subscriber information from the ISP that had issued the IP address.273 They identified the IP address as
belonging to Spencer and arrested him.274 The trial court convicted Spencer and the Court of Appeal affirmed.275 Spencer appealed.276
The Supreme Court of Canada ultimately dismissed Spencer’s appeal, but before they did, they concluded that Spencer
possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his subscriber
information, and thus the police conduct amounted to a
533 U.S. 27, 36–37 (2001) (finding that an inference applied to conduct does not
protect the initial conduct from being a search).
269. See, e.g., Wikipedia: IP Edits Are Not Anonymous, WIKIPEDIA, https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:IP_edits_are_not_anonymous [https://perma.cc/
Q46R-HJNL] (last modified June 30, 2019).
270. For an exploration and ultimate rejection of this alternative approach
to Fourth Amendment analysis called “mosaic theory,” see Orin S. Kerr, The
Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
271. R. v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 223 (Can.).
272. Id. at 221.
273. Id. at 222–23.
274. Id. at 223.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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search.277 The court performed a downstream analysis of the privacy risk posed by associating a person’s identity with their
online activity.278 The court concluded that removing the anonymous nature of the internet would significantly harm informational privacy, linking a person to a set of online activities.279
Such a holding would also neatly follow from the factors and
preferences laid out in Carpenter. Though the Carpenter factors
likely apply better to the information gained in the second order
compilation of an internet history,280 it is the ability to associate
the person with the information that renders the conduct a
search and subject to the traditional Fourth Amendment protections.
C. A REASONABLE SEARCH REQUIRES A WARRANT
If lower courts hold that any of the above three scenarios
constitute a search, they should additionally hold that, in most
cases, the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant. This conclusion derives from Carpenter, in which the Court reiterated a
preference that a warrant be obtained when law enforcement
seeks evidence of criminal wrongdoing.281 The warrant requirement is a doctrinally-supported and superior way to safeguard
internet privacy.282
277. Id. at 225.
278. See id. at 236 (“[T]he identity of a person linked to their use of the Internet must be recognized as giving rise to a privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s name, address and telephone number found in the subscriber
information.”).
279. Id. at 237–38.
280. See supra Part III.B.1.
281. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018) (“[W]arrantless searches are typically unreasonable where ‘a search is undertaken by law
enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing.’” (quoting
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–53 (1995))); see also United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (“Letters and other sealed packages
are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate
expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively
unreasonable.”).
282. But see Rozenshtein, supra note 225, at 953–54. Professor Rozenshtein
persuasively argues that instead of presumptively imposing a warrant requirement after finding a Carpenter search, a reasonableness test that looks at existing legislative standards could allow courts to expand Fourth Amendment coverage to more situations without infringing on legitimate government interests.
While this schema may have some merit in situations beyond the scope of this
Note, here it would likely reproduce the status quo by ratifying the standard set
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Some may argue that the warrant requirement is ultimately
toothless to protect privacy due to its ultimately flexible standard and the frequency with which magistrate judges approve
warrants.283 Even if warrants are granted with relative ease, ex
ante review is superior to ex post review in the context of the
warrant because ex post review cannot prevent the privacy injury.284 That is, a warrant requirement allows a neutral magistrate to prevent the privacy injury from ever occurring rather
than having to assess whether the search was reasonable after
it has already occurred. Moreover, it may be more difficult for a
judge to conclude probable cause did not exist when incriminating evidence sits before them. A warrant requirement, even if it
is ultimately a light burden, imposes decision costs on seeking a
search, which is likely to crowd out more questionable searches.
Police would still be able to obtain a warrant in the vast majority
of cases,285 but fishing expeditions would be further discouraged.
CONCLUSION
The internet, for all its flaws and foibles,286 has become an
indispensable component of modern life. People use the internet
to work, play, shop, learn, politically organize, find love and relationships, communicate secret thoughts and desires, and feel
a little less alone in the world. The anonymity afforded by the
internet allows communities to flourish and ideas to be freely
exchanged. The current state of internet protections, combined
with congressional inertia, threatens to clamp down on this free
exchange. Carpenter set out a vision for how to apply the Fourth
Amendment to digital privacy issues. Lower courts can and
forth in the Stored Communications Act and Pen/Trap Statutes. This is not desirable. See supra Part II.C.
283. See, e.g., Aziz Huq, The Latest Supreme Court Decision Is Being Hailed
as a Big Victory for Digital Privacy. It’s Not., VOX (June 23, 2018, 7:43 AM),
https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/6/22/17493632/carpenter-supreme
-court-privacy-digital-cell-phone-location-fourth-amendment [https://perma.cc/
YYS2-HBAK]. Huq argues that law enforcement can manipulate the warrant
application process to secure warrants easily. Id. Huq also suggests that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the probable cause requirement, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (establishing that probable cause is a
totality of the circumstances test), and increasing criminal liability have significantly weakened the requirement, see Huq, supra.
284. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(a) (1987).
285. See supra note 186.
286. See generally TWITTER, https://www.twitter.com.
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should begin to fulfill this vision by recognizing that collection of
internet history constitutes a search. While undoubtedly the internet has nefarious uses, imposing a warrant requirement on
collection of a person’s internet history checks the worst uses of
the internet while not chilling participation. Recognizing a
Fourth Amendment interest in internet history would help preserve core privacy interests and ultimately demonstrate a commitment to a transformative technology.

